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Introduction: Bread for the People; Work for the Emperor 
 Rumors were spreading around the streets and porticos of Rome. Ever since the annual 
convoy of grain ships from Alexandria became late, the Roman people were anxious. Was the 
convoy delayed by a late autumn gale? Or did a tempest destroy the convoy and its precious 
cargo? In most years, the people could trust in the grain reserves and the praefectus annonae’s 
management of the market. Due to a disappointing Sicilian harvest, however, this year was 
different. Since the people expected supplies to run out any day, people were beginning to horde 
grain for themselves. Prices skyrocketed. Unable to afford enough bread, the poor soon starved 
in the streets and within the tenements. In a few days, the poor plebeians grew restless. Reports 
spread about grain stashes and profiteers, about corruption and private scandals. In a few more 
days, conflicts arise. Some gather outside the houses of merchants; others inside the forum to 
demand political action. As demands become more and more radical, the peaceful protests 
degenerate into violence. Factions clash in the streets of Rome. Strife reigns. The Eternal City 
passes away. 
 Thanks to their prudent management of annona, the grain supply to the city of Rome, the 
emperors of the Principate avoided this sort of political strife. For the Romans, annona originally 
encompassed the contemporary economic concepts of market supply and price of food.1 In my 
argument, I will use the word annona in the Roman sense to encapsulate the entire evolving 
relationship between government and the food market. As early as Plautus’ Miles Gloriosus, 
annona possesses this dual sense: quí homines probi essent, esset is annona vilior, “he would be 
rather common in supply (or cheap in price) than whichever men are honest” (3.1.138).2 Due to 
                                                          
1Andrews, Freund, Lewis, and Short. 1966: 27.  
2 All translations are the work of the author. 
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the economic evolution of Rome, which I will explore in my first chapter, annona came to refer 
to government interventions within the market for food. Since wheat in the form of bread 
supplied the majority of calories, especially for the poorer plebeians, the government focused its 
interventions on the market for wheat.3 To ensure its supply, the Late Republic and the 
Principate introduced new infrastructure and incentives for private merchants to import it. One of 
the principal historians of the Principate, Tacitus, credits the rise of Augustus to his superior 
ability to organize annona (Annales 1.2).  
Sprouting from the major grain-exporting provinces, the system of annona extended to 
the city of Rome itself. Since the city of Rome exceeded the capacity of local food sources in its 
growth after the Punic Wars, Rome relied upon imports of foreign grain. Despite the variety of 
Roman grain sources, the fields of Sicily, North Africa, and Egypt supplied the majority of grain 
within the city of Rome.4 Scholar Lionel Casson estimates that in the first century CE Rome 
imported 60,000,000 modii or 400,000 tons of grain every year from North Africa and Egypt, 
using evidence from Aurelius Victor (Caesar 1.6) and Josephus (De bello Judaico libri 2.383, 
386).5 Casson’s estimate however ignores continuing Sicilian grain importation. Assuming 
Republican levels of production, Sicily could supply 2,500,000 modii.6  Although a relatively 
small exporter, Sicily remained a critical supplier of grain due to its proximity, especially just 
before the sailing season, when the Roman grain supply tended to run low.7  
                                                          
3 Rickman 1980: 7. 
4 See Pliny the Elder’s Historia Naturalis 18.12. 
5 Casson 1979: 21. 
6 Erdkamp 2005: 216. V.M. Scramuza bases his estimate on a Ciceronian remark that Verres collected 3,000,000 
modii tithe from Sicily. From this, Scramuza calculates a total Sicilian production of 38,800,000 modii, adding the 
production of tithe-exempt communities and the profit of the publicani. After subtracting the amount to seed the 
fields and to feed the population, Scramuza finds 2,500,000 modii available for export. Despite scholarly debate 
about the validity his assumptions, I include Scramuza’s number to provide a rough scale of magnitude estimate- as 
all the estimates of this paper are to a greater or lesser extent. See Scramuzza 1959 for Scramuzza’s original 
calculations and justifications. 
7 Erdkamp 2005: 219. 
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 Rather than through private sales, grain primarily entered the market through taxes-in-
kind and through the rental of Imperial lands. Tacitus records at frumenta et pecuniae vectigales, 
cetera publicorum fructuum societatibus equitum Romanorum agitabantur  (Ann. 4.6), “but grain 
and revenue of money and the other things of public income were handled by associations of the 
Roman equestrians.” Most of these grain levies, frumenta vectigales, emerged during the 
Republic, as the Roman Republic adapted the fiscal machinery of its conquered provinces to its 
own benefit. In Sicily, the Republic continued and expanded the system of grain-tithes that 
existed within Carthaginian Sicily and Greek Syracuse.8 While Augustus and his successors 
inherited similar arrangements in North Africa and Egypt, the Emperors also possessed 
substantial personal lands there, the partimonium principis, from their conquests and 
confiscations.9 Through their financial agents, procuratores, they leased the operations of the 
individual estates to estate operators, conductores. The conductores leased out parcels to 
sharecroppers, guaranteeing the emperor a vast income of grain.10 The farmers generally had to 
transport their grain to the village threshing floors for tax assessment.11 Having entered the 
market through taxes, grain entered unto the transport ships. 
 While the conductores and publicani handled the transport of grain rent or tax payments 
to the shipping ports in Sicily and North Africa, Egypt had special arrangements from Ptolemaic 
rule. After its transport during the months of April and May, local officials collected the grain 
from the taxpayers and organized its transport to state granaries during the months of May and 
June.12  Once in the granary, regional officials called sitologoi stored seed grain for next year’s 
                                                          
8 Rickman 1980: 37. 
9 Erdkamp 2005: 221. 
10 Ibid.: 222-3. 
11 Adams 2007: 166. Adams notes the possibility that state or imperial land-leasers may have paid the government to 
provide transportation. Despite the extensive documentation for Egyptian taxation, evidence for this aspect remains 
unclear, complicated through regional and temporal variations. 
12 Adams 2007: 169-70. 
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crop, private grain for trade, and public grain for Alexandria and ultimately Rome, while 
reporting their amounts to the strategos of their nome.13 In turn, the sitologoi managed the 
transport from granaries to ports, whether through barge or over-land transport. For over-land 
transport, the sitologoi relied on a system of transport donkey liturgies whereby strategoi 
compelled wealthy private individuals to supply three donkeys for a year.14 Once transported 
overland to a river port, porters loaded the Alexandria-bound ships, while the ship captains 
issued receipts to the strategoi.15 Under the supervision of the procurator Neaspoleos, the 
official overseer of Egyptian grain transport, the captains, who organized into shipping 
associations, transported the grain to Alexandria.16 From Alexandria, from other African ports, 
and from the ports of Sicily, porters loaded the grain into another set of ships for its transport 
across the Mediterranean Sea.  
 Since Augustus and his successors established no national merchant marine, despite 
Augustus’ creation of permanent naval fleets at Ravenna and Misenum, the navicularii and the 
negotiatores, the private shippers and grain merchants, conveyed the grain to Ostia during the 
summer months.17 In order to encourage the development of private shipments, the emperors 
created incentives for investment. Claudius, for instance, guaranteed the losses of the 
negotiatores during winter shipments; later emperors “exempted ship-owners from civic munera 
if they put at the state’s disposal a ship of c. 340 tons or several ships of c. 70 tons.”18 While 
Claudius’ intervention failed to extend the shipping season beyond the traditional late May to 
                                                          
13 Adams 2007: 171. 
14 Adams 2007.: 173. cf. the transport liturgy trionia onekakia with the Athenian institution of khorēgia- required 
sponsorship of a tragic chorus or a naval trireme.  
15 Adams 2007: 193. 
16 Adams 2007: 193. 
17 Rickman 1980: 71-2. 
18 Wilson 2011: 41. 
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early September window, later imperial interventions did lead to expansion of the grain fleet.19 
Upon reaching Ostia, the navicularii entered the “artificial harbor built at Portus by Claudius to 
provide a sheltered deep water harbor for the grain fleet, which previously had to anchor off the 
river mouth at Ostia.”20 Once in port, the procurator annonae, a subordinate of the praefectus 
annonae, and his staff paid the navicularii for their sea transport, after measuring and unloading 
their grain.21 With this payment, the final leg of this grain’s journey begins. 
 The procurator annonae and praefectus annonae, after managing the storage and 
shipment of grain from Ostia to Rome, distributed the grain for the annona. Until its transport, 
the procurator annonae stored the grain within a system of public granaries in Ostia, which he 
constructed and maintained.22  As in Rome, horreae, public granaries, in Ostia were a large 
series of brick-faced concrete rooms around a central corridor or courtyard, easily accessible to 
porters.23 In the storage rooms, small windows above the door and back wall, as well as a raised 
floor, created the dim and cool environment necessary to preserve grain.24 Once the procurator 
annonae secured transport, his staff loaded the grain onto one of the specialized river barges, the 
navis codicaria, in which a team of oxen or men could easily tow approximately 68 tons up the 
meandering 22 miles of the Tiber River.25 Having arrived in the Emporium district, Rome’s river 
port, the navis codicaria were unloaded by porters (saccarii) into Rome’s horreae where their 
cargo was measured and stored. To distribute frumentationes, free grain, or to manipulate the 
                                                          
19 Rickman 1980: 128. 
20 Wilson 2011: 47. 
21 Houston  1979: 160-1. 
22 Houston 1979: 161.   
23 Before the first century A.D., many of the “public” granaries were privately owned and rented by the state for its 
public grain distribution under “an unregimented system of private hire (locatio-conductio).” Through a process of 
confiscation and purchase, the Emperor gradually acquired the private granaries, adding too a number of newly 
constructed public granaries.  Rickman 1980: 137. 
24 Rickman 1980, 138. 
25 Rickman 1980, 19. 
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market price, the praefectus annonae could use the supplies from his horreae.26 To distribute the 
frumentationes to its recipients, the praefectus annonae from his headquarters in the Porticus 
Minucia Frumentia appointed a regular day each month and regular places, presumably either 
the horreae themselves or various portici.27 While the precise qualifications to receive public 
grain varied, all qualified recipients needed to present their tickets or tesserae in exchange for 
their public grain- some 5 modii or approximately enough for an adult male to survive.28  
 I offered a brief overview of the system that Augustus and his successors created to 
ensure the grain supply of Rome. Considering the politics behind its development, I conclude 
that Augustus and his successors subsumed the traditional authority of the Senate over annona to 
stabilize popular support for the Principate, developing a new infrastructure and imperial 
bureaucracy for its delivery. In the first chapter, after I contextualize the institution of annona in 
agricultural and logistical conditions of the ancient world, I will review its origins and its role in 
the politics of the Late Republic. In my second chapter, I will analyze the Res Gestae, Cassius 
Dio, Suetonius, and Tacitus to understand the evolution of imperial annona policy and its 
political implications. In my conclusion, I reflect upon the political and social impacts of the 
annona. Before I begin my argument, I wish to address two issues of data and methodology. 
 First, since few “official” records survive for the Principate, I will have to reconstruct the 
annona policy of the Principate and its political implications from ancient historical accounts. 
The Res Gestae and its sole mention of annona serve as our only official documentation from the 
reign of Augustus. Beyond this, I have to rely upon the conflicting accounts of the imperial 
historians: Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio. While Tacitus and Suetonius can agree upon the 
                                                          
26 Casson 1979: 25.  
27 For a further discussion of the Porticus Minucia Frumentia and its role in the later Principate, see Rickman 1980: 
253-6. 
28 Rickman 1980: 173, 186.  
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supply importance of Egypt (Historiae 1.11; Divus Augustus 18), the two do not report any other 
common facts. Instead, each author employs crises of grain distribution to characterize their 
subject emperors in their broader story. To learn what I can from history, I will contextualize the 
references to annona in the authors’ broader narrative about the emperors, the political context of 
the Principate, and the underlying economic conditions. 
 Second, since I depend substantially upon economic contextualization for my analysis, I 
will defend my ability to apply economic analysis in the ancient world against economic 
primitivism. As advanced in Moses I. Finley’s The Ancient Economy, the position of economic 
primitivism argues that since the ancients lack economic vocabulary, especially for the public 
economics, the ancients make their decisions on non-economic social grounds.29 Given that 
assumption, the primitivists conclude that economic analysis should not be applied to the ancient 
world. I protest every proposition of this argument. While the economic vocabulary of the 
ancient world lacks the precision of modern economic terminology, the concept of annona as 
supply and price of food reflects an economic and political awareness, at least for the Romans. 
Since demand for food is stable, the supply and price will change together. Even if I would 
accept the first proposition, I could still reject the second. Since Roman senators were not to 
engage in trade, the majority seem to have appointed freemen to manage their mercantile affairs. 
Should one accept the primitivist position, one cannot explain why senators would trouble 
themselves with trade in the first place. Once the ancients decide in an economic fashion, 




                                                          
29Finley 1999: 1. 
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Chapter 1: Sowing the Seeds (509-27BCE) 
In this chapter, I explore the practical context of the annona and its evolving role in the 
politics of the Roman Republic (509-27 BCE). Despite the improvements of the Roman Republic 
and Empire, grain as a bulk commodity remained too expensive to transport except over the sea. 
Combined with volatile weather and limited agricultural technology, the challenges of 
transportation ensured that the annona would become an issue in the city of Rome. Before the 
Punic Wars, the Roman Senate managed the annona with only its own special shipments of grain 
to maintain control over the plebeians in times of crisis. While the economic dislocations and 
transformation of the Punic and Macedonian Wars created new challenges for the maintenance 
of the annona, the Senate did not employ its authority to address these challenges with new 
policies out of its own self-interest. To remedy the issues of the annona, the Gracchi brothers as 
tribunes passed a series of novel reforms, the first land and grain distributions, between 133 and 
123 BCE through the consilium plebis, the legislature of the plebeians. While the Senate stopped 
the Gracchi brothers and reversed their achievements through cooption and coercion by 81 BCE, 
the Senate restored grain distributions in 75 BCE. Due to its administrative inability, the Senate 
lost its authority over piracy and over the distribution in 67 and 58 BCE through a series of 
radical tribunes despite cooption and coercion. In the final days of the Republic, Pompey and 
Caesar reformed the distributions to make them sustainable. I conclude that, while the Senate and 
its elite fought enterprising politicians to maintain its traditional annona authority throughout the 
Roman Republic, the Senate failed to achieve a successful system of annona administration. 
The harsh constraints of ancient agriculture and logistics shaped the development of 
annona through the course of Roman history. Despite the development of the Roman road 
system, the Mediterranean Sea was the Roman world’s fastest and cheapest method of 
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transportation. By pack animal, an eighth of a ton of goods could travel three miles an hour on 
the road; by cart, a half-ton of goods two miles an hour.30 With the proper prevailing winds, a 
ship with eighty tons of goods could clip along at four miles per hour.31 While no direct evidence 
exists for the Republic and Principate, Diocletian’s Edict suggests that in the fourth century one 
could ship grain from Syria to Spain by sea more cheaply than from Rome to Pompeii by land.32 
Despite their speed and economy, ships were still too slow to carry foods other than wine, olive 
oil, fish sauce, and grain due to spoilage. Of the transportable food stuffs, grain was the only one 
with enough nourishment to feed the Roman people. Five modii or 75 pounds of the preferred 
grain, wheat, could feed an adult male for a month with only a few other fruits and vegetables to 
supply his nutrients.33 Since the Romans had to import grain for food because of their logistical 
constraints, the constraints of cereal production become important to the development of annona. 
In the ancient Mediterranean, agriculture was characterized by high volatility and low 
yields. If rainfall and temperatures vary from year-to-year and place-to-place within the ancient 
Mediterranean, as in the modern, ancient agriculture would suffer from frequent crop failures. 
Examining the crop-critical October-May precipitation within Attica between 1931 and 1960, 
Peter Garnsey finds that wheat fails more than once every four years and barley once every 
twenty.34 Even accounting for higher Italian rainfall, wheat and even barley failed often. Since 
ancient farmers had to ensure their own food supply in the volatile Mediterranean climate, 
whether as tenants on large farms or owners of their own fields, farmers would have chosen to 
cultivate their fields less intensively and more extensively, following the strategy of more recent 
                                                          
30 Rickman 1980: 14. 
31 Rickman notes how Ostia-Alexandria ships could make the journey of a thousand miles in ten days. By 
comparison, the return voyage was double the time on a less direct route. See Rickman 1980: 15. 
32 Rickman 1980: 15. 
33 Rickman 1980: 5. 
34 Garnsey 1988: 10. 
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peasant communities.35 Instead of one big central field, ancient farmers would have had several 
smaller fields in their local region to take advantage of mirco-climates.36 Instead of one grain, 
they would have grown several different grains. 37 While lower risk barley and millet satisfied 
the dietary needs of ancient farmers, they grew higher risk wheat for their tax and rent payments. 
Urban consumers valued wheat over barley and millet for its ability to make bread  rather than 
porridge.38 Even if the climate and farmer acclimations had not conspired against annona, 
annona would have still encountered the limitations of ancient agricultural technology. 
 Roman farmers were subject to the limitations of ard agriculture. An ard is an early form 
of plow. Unlike the later forms of the plow, ards can only scratch the surface of land enough to 
seed the land, not to prepare the land. Before plowing, farmers had to remove the vegetation 
from their fields with hoes.39 Without the horse collar, ancient farmers employed relatively slow 
oxen and mules to drive their ards.40 Since the land preparation consumed so much labor, 
farmers tended to fallow a half of their fields in any given year, leaving the agricultural burden 
on half of the land. According to a contemporary analysis, Roman agriculture would have 
yielded an average surplus of around 65.52 pounds of grain per acre compared with yields of 
305.78 pounds per acre with modern fallow-less plow agriculture.41 Lower yields mean that 
Roman farmers would have required around four times more land to feed Rome than modern 
farmers. Combined with climatic and logistical challenges, the limits of agricultural technology 
made annona an inevitable problem for the Republic. 
                                                          
35 For peasant agriculture in the Mediterranean, see Halstead: 2014. 
36 Garnsey 1988: 46. 
37 Garnsey 1988: 49. 
38 Rickman 1980: 5. 
39 Mazoyer and Roudart. 2006: 54. 
40Rickman 1980: 13. 
41 Mazoyer and Roudart 2006: 56.  
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 Before the Punic Wars, the Roman Senate managed the annona, according to later 
histories, with only its own special shipments of grain to maintain control over the plebeians in 
times of crisis. While the historians of the period wrote several hundred years after the fact, their 
accounts could have relied upon the annals of the Pontifex Maximus and its reliable records of 
high food prices, climatic conditions, and warfare. 42 From the annuals and the traditions, Livy 
and his fellows could have reconstructed the history of annona with relative precision. Scholar 
Peter Garnsey counts sixteen grain crises before the Punic Wars.43 Of these early sixteen crises, 
two offer the most insight into early annona: first the crisis of 492 BCE; second the situation of 
440-439 BCE.  
In 492 BCE, the Senate assumed the final responsibility to maintain the annona. Livy 
records that after a year of tension between the patricians and plebeians about the burdens of 
military conscription and consequent debt slavery, eo anno cum et foris quieta omnia a bello 
essent et domi sanata discordia, aliud multo gravius malum civitatem invasit, caritas primum 
annonae ex incultis per secessionem plebis agris, fames deinde, qualis clausis solet (2.34.1-2), 
“In that year, when every place outside was undisturbed by war and the discord at home was 
healed, another much more serious evil visited the city. First, there was dearness of grain supply 
from a lack of cultivation through the departure of the plebs from the fields, then famine, such as 
a besieged city is accustomed.” In response to the crisis, the Senate sent emissaries to seek grain 
from Etruria to Sicily (2.34). In that moment, however, senator Marcius Coriolanus attempted to 
persuade his fellow senators to withhold their supply of grain from the plebeians so that the 
Senate might compel them to surrender the tribuneship. Rejecting the proposal of Coriolanus and 
abandoned him to suffer the plebeians’ wrath, the Senate established a tradition of its 
                                                          
42 Garnsey 1988: 167. 
43 Garnsey 1988: 168-172. 
 Ruter 14 
 
responsibility over annona (2.35). In fifty-two years, the Senate would guard its responsibility 
against an equestrian benefactor. 
In 439 BCE, the Senate and its representative Lucius Minucius defended their 
responsibility for annona against Spurius Maelius. Since the grain crop had failed in the previous 
year, Rome experienced a bumper crop of political contention in 439 BCE. Over the protests of 
the Senate, for whom the evident cause of the crisis was popular politics and its distractions, the 
tribunes secured the extraordinary appointment of Lucius Minucius as praefectus annonae (Livy 
Ab Urbe 4.12). Despite his earnest efforts to seek grain from the Italians, to imitate grain dealers, 
and to disperse hordes of grain, Lucius was utterly unsuccessful as the praefectus annonae. In 
response, Livy records how:  
tum Sp. Maelius ex equestri ordine, ut illis temporibus praedives, rem utilem pessimo 
 exemplo peiore consilio est adgressus. frumento namque ex Etruria privata pecunia per 
 hospitum clientiumque ministeria coempto, quae, credo, ipsa res ad levandam publica 
 cura annonam impedimento fuerat, largitiones frumenti facere instituit plebemque hoc 
 munere delinitam, quacumque incederet, conspectus elatusque supra modum 
 hominis privati secum trahere, haud dubium consulatum favore ac spe despondentem. 
 (Ab Urbe 4.13) 
 
Then Spurius Maelius from the equestrian order, as a rich man for those times, tempered 
 with a useful undertaking in the worst precedent with worse judgement. For when he had 
 purchased grain from Etruria with his personal money through the work of his foreign 
 guest-friends and his clients, which affair itself I believe was an impediment to alleviate 
 the grain market with public care, he organized a public distribution for grain. By this 
  service, the plebeians were charmed. Whenever he walked, he was seen and was raised 
 to bear himself above the mode of a private man. The man was not in doubt in his support 
 and despairing in his hope for the consulship. 
 
Seeing how the popular Spurius Maelius subverted its traditional authority with his purchases of 
available grain, the Roman Senate appointed Cincinnatus and Servilius Ahala as Dictator and 
Master of the Horse to take control over the situation (4.14). When Sevilius summoned Spurius 
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for trial before Cincinnatus and the Senate, Spurius resisted and was killed (4.15). In their actions 
against Spurius, the Senate established an undisputed authority over the annona. 
 While the economic dislocations and transformation of the Punic and Macedonian Wars 
created new challenges for the maintenance of the annona, the Senate did not address these 
challenges out of its own self-interest. Since the legions of the Roman Republic conscripted 
recruits only from the ranks of landowners, the small peasant farmers of Italy often suffered long 
absences from their farmlands during the period of the Punic and Macedonian Wars.44 To escape 
the conscription, small peasant farmers started to sell their lands to the wealthy. 45  Thanks to 
their control of war contracts and war booty, a small class of senators and equestrians in Rome 
had become wealthy enough to make large investments in large rural estates full of profitable 
pasture lands.46 These displaced small farmers would converge upon the city of Rome to build its 
infrastructure and to support its wars. Hence, the population of Rome grew an average of 4,000 
people per annum after the Punic War.47 With its large population of 500,000 people, Rome 
strained its traditional supplies of grain in Italy. Given the constraints of ancient logistics, 
farmers near to Rome devoted their fields to the production of fruits, vegetables, and meat to 
exploit the local demand of the wealthy, straining the grain supply further.48 Despite these new 
challenges, the Senate created no new policy to replace its previous ad hoc measures and to 
address the concerns of Rome’s new inhabitants out of its self-interest.  
 Due to the electoral system, the Senate represented the interests of the wealthy 
equestrians and Senators rather than the poor plebeians. Like the United States before 1911, the 
                                                          
44 Stockton 1979: 9. 
45 Kay 2014: 25. Between 225 and 23 BCE, the median size of the Roman army amounted to some 13% of the adult 
male citizen population, perhaps the highest proportion of a pre-industrial state. 
46 Stockton 1979: 12. 
47 Morley 1996: 39.  
48 Morley 1996: 86-90.  Besides vegetable and fruit production, Morley identifies that tombs and pleasure parks 
additionally displaced grain-land. 
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citizens of the Roman Republic did not directly elect their Senators. Instead the citizens elected 
two censors in the comitia centuria, centuriate assembly, to select their new Senators from the 
ranks of the junior magistrates, the quaestors and the aediles.49 While an indirect election could 
have represented the poor, the voting procedures of comitia centuria ensured that the censors 
considered the interests of the wealthy. Organized into five classes on the basis of wealth, the 
Roman citizens voted as part of 193 centuries in order of their wealth.50 Since the majority vote 
of 97 centuries could decide an election, elections were often decided by the three wealthiest 
classes.51 Given the influence of the wealthy, consuls and censors not surprisingly came from a 
few wealthy old families with the exception of a few novi homines, “new men.”52 While consuls 
and censors could have run on the platform of the wealthy interests and then reneged on their 
election promises, the equestrian and senatorial domination of courts and law enforcement 
ensured the obedience of the consuls and censors to their interests.53 Given its constituency, the 
Senate could not agree upon any new policy to address the fundamental issues of the annona.  
 While the Senate could have implemented new three policies to address the annona’s 
issues in the context of the second century BCE, the wealthy constituents of the Senate would 
have opposed any new action.54 First, the Senate could have resettled the expanding population 
of poor plebeians on public lands, the ager publicus, to reduce demand. Formed from 
confiscations of defeated Italian states in the third century BCE, the ager publicus had come 
under the long-term occupation of Rome’s elites and Italian allies by the second century BCE.55 
Given the political influence of the elites, the Senate would have avoided any appropriation of 
                                                          
49 Stockton 1978: v. 
50 Stockton 1978: ix. 
51 Millar 1998: 17. 
52 Stockton 1978: iix. 
53 Stockton 1978: xi. 
54 Garnsey 1988: 69. 
55 Roselaar 2010: 150; Stockton 1979: 135. 
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their property. Second, the Senate could have prescribed the growing of grain instead of cattle or 
wine in Italy. Beyond the challenges of enforcement, the Senate would have avoided any 
restriction on land usage out of financial self-interest of its members. Thanks to the Lex Claudia 
of 218 BCE, which prohibited Senators from the direct possession of trade vessels, and long-
standing cultural norms, Senators focused their investments in agriculture.56 Regarding 
agriculture, even Cato the Elder, infamous as a severe proponent of traditional society, advised 
his readers to invest in vineyards and vegetable gardens over grainland for higher returns (De 
Agri. 1). Third, the Senate could have subsidized the transportation and sale of grain for the poor 
plebeians. While grain subsidies would not have hurt the economic interests of the Senate, state 
grain subsidies would have removed a political opportunity for Senators to win supporters with 
shipments of cheap grain.57 By this time, the major families of Senators had invested in major 
warehouses to store their patronage and made contacts in the comitia centuria to distribute it.58 
Unable to act, even if still able to react, the Senate ceded the initiative over the annona to the 
popular assembly of the plebs, concilium plebis. 
 Unlike the comitia centuria, the concilium plebis represented the poor Roman citizenry 
and their interests. In the concilium plebis, the majority of the Roman citizens joined one of 
thirty five “tribes” to enact public laws.59 Since the tribes were of equal size to represent the four 
urban districts in Rome and thirty one rural districts across Italy, each voter possessed an equal 
say in the vote of the tribe. While a minority of wealthy rural voters had once had outsize 
influence due to the high cost of travel, the migration of poor rural voters with rural registrations 
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59 Since the comitia tribuna was formed after the succession of the plebeians in 492 BCE to give the plebeians a 
voice, the assembly excluded a small number of wealthy patrician families from its votes. Stockton 1979: ix. 
 Ruter 18 
 
eroded their influence.60 Of equal importance, the tribes voted in a random order. While a fixed 
order would have given the second seventeen tribes less influence than the first eighteen, who 
could decide the matter on their own, a random order gave every tribe and hence every voter an 
equal vote.61 Since individual voters in the concilium plebis could not propose amendments to 
legislation, it is important that the concilium plebis also elected tribunes of plebeians from 
among the Senatorial class. As the leaders of the concilium plebis, the tribunes proposed its 
legislation. While Senators might have threatened the tribunes to stop the radical regulations, the 
tribunes enjoyed personal protection from the Senate and a personal veto over its acts while in 
the city of Rome. Under a succession of populist leaders, the populares, the concilium plebis 
addressed the issues of the annona.  
In 133 BCE, the tribune Tiberius Gracchus passed his lex Sempronia agaria through the 
concilium plebis to resettle poor Romans on the ager publicus. Re-imposing the previous limit of 
500 iugera or around 300 acres on personal occupations of the ager publicus, the lex Sempronia 
agaria compensated wealthy landholders for their loss of the ager publicus. In exchange for a 
secure unalienable title over legal occupations of 300 acres, with an additional 150 acres per son, 
the lex Sempronia agaria called for people with excessive holdings to surrender them to a public 
lands commission (App. Civ. Bel. 1.9). Composed of three men, the elected commission 
surveyed, recovered, and transferred parcels of the ager publicus in approximately 20 acre 
allotments to poor Romans. After the Senate under the leadership of his own cousin Scipio 
Nasica refused to fund his commission and its expenses, Tiberius passed a second law, the 
rogatio Sempronia de pecunia regis Attali, to appropriate funds from the bequest of King Attalus 
III Philometer for his commission (Plutarch Tib. Grac. 13). While the Senate accepted his first 
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law as within his jurisdiction as tribune, Tiberius had subsumed in his second law too much of 
Senate’s authority over foreign affairs. Facing the prospect of a second term, Scipio Nasica and a 
group of fellow Senators ambushed Tiberius and his followers, disposing of their bodies in the 
Tiber River (App. Civ. Bel. 1.17). Despite the death of Tiberius, his land reform commission 
lived on. Without the support of Senate, the commission unable to clear out the claims of Italian 
cities ran out of available ager publicus after 129 BCE.62 While his commission had resettled 
approximately 15,000 Romans after a survey of around 1268 square miles of land, the problem 
of annona remained too pressing to ignore.63  
 In 123 BCE, tribune Gaius Gracchus, the brother of Tiberius, passed the lex frumentaria, 
the public grain distribution law, to little Senatorial opposition. Under the law, every resident 
citizen of Rome could buy some amount of subsidized wheat every month at a fixed price (App. 
Civ. Bel. 1.21). While the Senate complained about the law and questioned the motivations of 
Gaius, especially since the public distributions won Gaius the support of the plebeians, the 
Senate seems to have acquiesced to the proposal. In the first book of his Civil Wars, Appius 
offers no mention of a Senatorial backlash against Gaius and his lex frumentaria. In his later 
philosophical discourse, Tusculan Disputations, Cicero recounts how one of the law’s opponents, 
Senator L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, collected his allotment and when questioned replied nolim mea 
bona, Gracche, tibi viritim dividere libeat, sed, si facias, partem petam, “I would not wish that it 
pleases you to divide my goods man by man but if you would, I will seek my portion” (3.48). To 
give Senator Frugi his portion, Gaius had to legislate new taxes and tax collection reforms for the 
province of Asia.64 Despite its acquiescence, the Senate soon made noise against Gaius. 
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In 122 BCE, Gaius Gracchus pushed forward the lex agraria, the agricultural law, and 
the lex Rubria, the Rubrian law, causing a conflict with the Senate. Since Plutarch and Livy’s 
epitomist only allude to the lex agraria in their accounts, while Appian offers no comment, 
scholar David Stockton speculates that the lex agraria would have empowered the land reform 
commission of Tiberius Gracchus to apportion the ager publicus outside of Italy for colonial 
cities and individuals.65 Since his new colonial cities would have expanded the political power of 
Gaius beyond its base in the city of Rome, the Senate recruited his fellow tribune Lucius Drusus 
to counter his proposals. Drusus vetoed his lex agraria, gave the plebs rent-free public land, and 
offered the twelve new colonial cities (App. Bel. Civ. 1.23; Plut. Vit. Cai. Grac. 10). Thanks to 
Drusus’s generosity, Gaius lost the majority of his supporters. When his fellow tribune Gaius 
Rubrus passed the lex Rubria to resettle the plain of Carthage with the new colonial city of 
Junonia, despite its historical and religious significance, Gaius Gracchus took leadership of the 
project after his selection by lot (App. Bel. Civ. 1.24). After Gaius surveyed site of the city and 
returned to Rome for 6000 settlers, the wolves demolished his survey markers. Given the 
religious significance of the site, Senate considered the wolves a bad omen and called an 
extraordinary meeting of the comitia centuria to repeal the lex Rubria (App. Bel. Civ. 1.24). In 
response, Gaius rallied his supporters to storm the Senate. After one of his band killed an 
innocent by-stander, his supporters abandoned Gaius. Before the agents of the Senate caught up 
with a fugitive Gaius, Gaius killed himself (App. Bel. Civ. 1.26). After the suicide of Gaius, the 
Senate faced no imminent serious threat to its authority over the annona.  
 Unthreatened by the populares for a generation, the Senate and the optimates, its 
conservative faction, rolled back the legislative achievements of the Gracchi brothers. In the 
immediate aftermath of Gaius’ suicide, the tribunes of the plebs under the influence of the Senate 
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undid the lex agraria, allowing for the sale of its land grants and for the dissolution of its 
commission (App. Bel. Civ. 1.27). Since Gaius’ lex frumentaria had proved itself as a popular 
measure able to forestall more radical proposals like the lex agraria, the Senate and its agents 
were open to its continuation in some form. Due to its costs, the optimates sought to scale back 
the lex frumentaria. In 119 BCE, Gaius Marius as tribune of the plebs opposed an attempted 
expansion of the lex frumentaria to carry favor with the Senate’s optimates (Plut. Mar. 4). 
Between 119 BCE and 100 BCE, Marcus Octavius replaced the lex frumentaria with his lex 
Octavia (Cic. Brut. 62.222).66 Since Cicero praised the law for its comparative restraint in grain 
distributions, the lex Octavia appears to have cut eligibility, ration size, or ration price, through it 
is impossible to confirm. By 100 BCE, however, the populares returned to Roman politics. 
In 100 CE, tribune Saturnius proposed a replacement lex frumentaria. Among its other 
lost provisions, his law would have reduced the price of the grain ration significantly from six 
and a third asses to five-sixth of an ass for three pounds of grain (Cic. Ad Herenn. 1.12). In 
response, the Senate empowered the two quaestors of year, Quintus Servilius Caepio and Lucius 
Calpurnius Piso, to counter Saturnius’ proposal with additional grain purchases and distributions. 
To advertise their effort, Caepio and Piso minted coinage with the legend, Ad Fru(mentum) 
Emu(ndum) ex s.c., “to purchase grain distributions by the decree of the Senate.”67 Having 
satisfied the moderate plebeians, the Senate ordered the consul Marius to arrest Saturnius. With 
the arrest of Saturnius, the Senate had stopped the populares and started a new ascendency of the 
optimates for over a generation. By 81 BCE, in fact, the Senate had even repealed the lex 
Octavia and suspended its discount grain distributions.  
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In an attempt to placate the plebeians of Rome after the famine of 75 BCE, however, the 
Senate reformed the annona. Spurred by the Mithridatic Wars, provincial famine and piracy had 
pushed the price of food out of the budgets of poor plebeians in Rome.68 In 75 BCE, an angry 
mob of hungry plebeians chased two consuls and a praetor from the forum (Sall. Hist. 2.45). In 
74 BCE, the Senate expanded its oversight of the annona. The Senate appointed praetor Marcus 
Antonius, a former consul, in an extraordinary post with unlimited authority to chase down the 
pirates of Crete.69 In 73 BCE, the consuls Marcus Terentius Varro Lucullus and Gaius Cassius 
Longinus with the approval of the Senate passed the lex Terentia et Cassia frumentria. Under 
this law, some part of the population regained the right to purchase an amount of grain at a fixed 
price, possibly the original Gracchan price of six and a third asses for three pounds.70 To support 
the distributions, the law authorized the purchase of up to 3.8 million modii or 5700 hundred tons 
of grain from Sicily (Cic. In Verr. 4.30.72). Since Marcus Antonius and his successor Quintus 
Metellus could not clear the seas of piracy, even with their unlimited authority, the lex Terentia 
et Cassia frumentria failed to address the concerns of the plebeians. Out of this Senatorial 
failure, a new generation of populares saw their success. 
 Spurred by pirate attacks, the tribune Aulus Gabinius passed the lex Gabinia though the 
consilium plebis over the opposition of the Senate to give leadership over the anti-piratical 
campaign to Pompey. By 67 BCE, pirates harassed Ostia and the other major ports of Italy from 
their “territory” in the provinces (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 36.22). Controlling of the seas, pirates 
intercepted Rome’s imports of food and increased food prices. To remedy the situation, Aulus 
proposed the lex Gabinia. Under the law, the consilium plebis would elect from the ex-consuls a 
man to lead a large force against the pirates with supreme authority across the sea, on every 
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shore, and upto fifty miles inland (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 36.23). Since the law would take away 
the power of the Senate’s agent, Quintus Metellus, and give it to the people’s preferred 
champion, Pompey, the Senate opposed the law as before with the lex agraria of Gaius 
Gracchus. First, the Senate attempted to assassinate Gabinius in the Curia, the Senate house 
(Cass. Dio Rom. His. 36.24). When Gabinius escaped, a crowd of plebeians stormed the Curia in 
an attempt to avenge him. Like Gabinius, the Senate managed an escape. Second, the Senate 
attempted to recruit his fellow tribunes to obstruct the lex Gabinia. While Lucius Trebellius and 
Lucius Roscius did try, Gabinius with the help of the crowd intimidated them enough to 
overcome their protests (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 36.30). Unable to oppose, the Senate conceded to 
the lex Gabinia. On the first day of Pompey’s appointment, the price of grain fell out of 
expectation (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 44); in three months, Pompey cleared the seas and settled the 
problem of the piracy with his resettlement of pirates.71 While Cato the Younger, the leader of 
the optimates, made one last desperate attempt in 62 BCE to forestall further usurpation of the 
Senatorial authority over the annona with a decree to expand eligibility for grain distributions, 
the lex Gabinia and its success marks the beginning of the end for the Senate’s authority over the 
annona. 
In 58 BCE, the tribune Publius Clodius Pulcher passed his lex Clodia frumentaria with 
little Senatorial opposition to subsume the entire Senatorial authority over the annona for his 
political benefit. Under the lex Clodia frumentaria, Clodius made public grain distributions free 
for the first time.72 To manage the annona and his distributions, Clodius appointed his agent 
Sextius Cloelius with absolute authority over the entire annona (Cic. De Domo 25). Despite his 
radical assumption of power, the Senate and its optimates offered little resistance. Following the 
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Lex Clodia de rege Ptolemaeo et de insula Cypro publicando, “the Clodian Law about making 
the Ptolemaic Kingdom and the island Cyprus public property,” Cato the Younger, the leader of 
the optimates, had to administer the annexation of Cyprus from Ptolemaic Egypt and the sale of 
Ptolemaic property that year. Ironically, optimatas Cato’s collection of 7,000 talents funded the 
free distributions of popularis Clodius.73 With his distributions, Clodius fed his political base of 
poor citizens and freedmen, winning their militant loyalty.74 While Clodius had set the precedent 
for the future political employment of the annona, Clodius and his agent Sextius Cloelius proved 
unable to manage the annona themselves. 
To weaken the power of Clodius and his inept agent Sextius Cloelius, the consuls Publius 
Cornelius Lentulus and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos passed in 57 BCE through the comitia 
tributa the Lex Cornelia Caecilia de cura annonae Cn. Pompeio mandanda, “the Cornelian 
Caecilian Law concerning the care of the annona to be given to Pompey.” Within a year, Sextus 
Cloelius proved himself unable to manage the annona. When a new wave of rural migrants in 
search of free grain coincided with poor harvests, Sextus resorted to threats against negotiatores, 
grain merchants, and confiscations.75 Without the negotiatores, the situation became a crisis. To 
attract the negotiatores back and fix the annona, Lentulus and Nepos passed a law through the 
comitia tributa, a third assembly under the consuls’ leadership with equivalent election rules to 
the concilium plebis.76 Rather than dismantle free distributions or pass the mantle to a Senator, 
risking popular opposition, Lentulus and Nepos gave Pompey the anti-piratical champion of the 
people the cura annonae, care of the grain market, for five full years. While the Lex Cornelia 
Caecilia did not assign Pompey the same extraordinary power over the army, navy, and treasury 
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as the Lex Gabinia, the law gave Pompey fifteen assistants and significant grants.77 Over three 
years, Pompey and his agents created long-term contracts for the annona, gave citizenship to 
negotiatores, and eliminated the ineligible from the frumentationes.78 Through his initiatives, 
Pompey fixed the annona for the next ten years, when the chaos of his civil war against Caesar 
undid his achievements. 
After his civil war against Pompey, Julius Caesar made a series of reforms as dictator 
between 49 and 44 BCE to secure the annona for his plebeian supporters. While Caesar and 
Pompey had allied for their political agenda, Caesar fought against Pompey and the Senate after 
the Senate decreed the dissolution of his legions, disregarded the veto of the tribunes, and drove 
them away (Sue. Div. Jul. 30). After Caesar overcame Pompey and celebrated his victories with 
a series of generous grain and meat distributions, Caesar set upon himself the difficult task to 
reform the management of the annona (Sue. Div. Jul. 38). In the midst of a broader population 
increase, the number of public grain recipients jumped to 320,000 over the civil war (Sue. Div. 
Jul. 41; Cass. Dio Rom. His. 43.21). Employing a district by district survey, Caesar reduced the 
dole to a more manageable 150,000 people and tasked the praetors of the city with the 
maintenance of the recipient list. To ease the administration of the grain distributions and the 
annona under the aediles, Caesar appointed two new officials, the aediles Cereales (Cass. Dio 
Rom. His. 43.51). Likewise, Caesar resettled 80,000 citizens of Rome into overseas colonial 
settlements (Sue. Div. Jul. 42). While Caesar contemplated the creation of a Tiber River canal 
from Terracina to further ease shipment to harborless Ostia, his assassination in 44 BCE delayed 
the creation of an Ostian port for 88 years. In the next year, the Senate prohibited the creation of 
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another cura annonae in a vain attempt to stave off one man rule (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 45.17). 
By then, however, it was too late. 
I conclude that while the Senate and its elite fought enterprising politicians to maintain its 
traditional annona authority throughout the Roman Republic the Senate failed to achieve a 
successful system of annona administration. Given the wealth of its members, the Senate was 
slow to realize the issues of the annona. Even when the Senate realized the importance of food 
access for the plebeians, after the populares exploited public land and grain distributions for 
popularity, the Senate and its elites could not re-organize the management of the annona to 
accommodate the scale of Rome because of its internal divisions. Instead, Pompey and Caesar 
with their extraordinary powers reorganized the distribution of grain in the city of Rome. While 
the two addressed the issues of their day, neither created a long-term system to control the 
annona. In the Principate, however, Augustus and his successors created a new system out of the 
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Reaping the Augustan Revolution:  Annona and the Principate (27BCE-193CE) 
 In this chapter, I address the politics of annona and their evolution throughout the 
Principate (27BCE-235CE). Since the Julio-Claudian dynasty represents the most formative 
period for the politics of annona in the Principate, I will focus my account between the reigns of 
Augustus and Nero (27 BCE-68CE) with a summary of later developments (68CE-235CE). 
Furthermore, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio each offer a substantial account of the Julio-
Claudian dynasty unlike later periods of the Principate.  
Before I begin my account, I will offer the reader a brief overview. In the grain shortage 
of 23 BCE, Augustus attempted to support the traditional authority of the Senate on annona 
under the Republican guise of a personal cura annonae to prevent an overthrow of his 
constitutional settlement in 27 BCE. Since the Senate proved itself too weak to administer 
annona, Augustus again tried to support its authority with further imperial aid, offices, and 
reforms in 18 BCE. Augustus, however, ceased his attempts to strengthen the Senate’s authority 
over annona with imperial aid after the food shortage of 6 CE. Following his attempt in 7 CE to 
regulate the annona with two ex-consuls, Augustus created the imperial office of the praefectus 
annonae. Despite his initial attempt to “republicanize” the annona, Tiberius failed to undo the 
administrative reforms of Augustus. To remedy the reckless disregard of Caligula’s reign, 
Claudius expanded the role of the emperor and his officials with his assumption of the Senate’s 
taxation and port authority. To secure his own political support, Nero subsumed the Senate’s 
authority over the public distributions. After Nero’s mismanagement of annona contributed to 
his fall, the Flavian dynasty (69-96 CE) continued the annona without any radical changes. 
Despite Nerva’s “republicanizing” reforms, the Antonine dynasty of emperors (98-192 CE) 
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expanded the annona to augment their popular support. I conclude that over the course of the 
Principate the emperors subsumed control of the annona from the Senate. 
 In the shortage of 23 BCE, Augustus attempted to support the traditional authority of the 
Senate on annona under the Republican guise of a personal cura annonae to prevent an 
overthrow of his constitutional settlement in 27 BCE. After his victory at Actium in 31 BCE, 
Augustus became the hegemon of the Roman world with unprecedented control over his force of 
around 200,000 men and his Egyptian fortune.79 Over his civil wars, Augustus had destroyed any 
organized opposition to his hegemony, whether from the faction of Cassius and Brutus, from that 
of Marcus Antonius, or from that of Sextus Pompeius, killing the leaders and co-opting the 
followers (Sue. Div. Aug. 9). Without political opposition, Augustus reorganized the Roman 
polity over three years as a consul. In the process, Augustus rescinded his unconstitutional laws 
of the civil wars, expelled unworthy men from the Senate, and ultimately redistributed wealth to 
the remaining Senators (Cass. Dio His. Rom. 52. 42 and 53.2). Augustus could very well achieve 
his agenda whether for his personal safety or for political vision.80 His efforts culminated in the 
constitutional settlement of 27 BCE. While Augustus retained supervision of the border 
provinces and their armies, Augustus returned the interior provinces to the popular governance of 
the people (53.12). While Cassius Dio recorded no action about annona in his constitutional 
settlement, I infer that the annona would have reverted to the Senate and its agents, the aediles 
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cereales, since Augustus assigned the Senate all the major grain provinces except Egypt, a minor 
source at the time. No matter what Augustus had planned in 27 BCE, fortune would compel his 
plans to change.  
 After the Tiber River flooded away Rome’s reserves of grain in 24 BCE, Augustus 
attempted to support the traditional authority of Senate. Cassius Dio offers the sole account of 
the supply crisis of 24 BCE:  
τῷ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένῳ ἔτει, ἐν ᾧ Μᾶρκος τε Μάρκελλος καὶ Λούκιος Ἀρρούντιος 
 ὑπάτευσαν, ἥ τε πόλις πελαγίσαντος αὖθις τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπλεύσθη, καὶ κεραυνοῖς ἄλλα τε 
 πολλὰ ἐβλήθη καὶ οἱ ἀνδριάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ Πανθείῳ, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δόρυ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ 
 Αὐγούστου χειρὸς ἐκπεσεῖν. πονούμενοι οὖν ὑπό τε τῆς νόσου καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ ῾ἔν τε 
 γὰρ τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ πάσῃ ὁ λοιμὸς ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν χώραν οὐδεὶς εἰργάσατο: δοκῶ δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ ἐν 
 τοῖς ἔξω χωρίοις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συνηνέχθἠ νομίσαντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι οὐκ ἄλλως σφίσι 
 ταῦτα συμβεβηκέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὴ καὶ τότε ὑπατεύοντα (54.1). 
 
“But with the year coming in which Marcus Marcellus and Lucius Arruntius were 
 consuls, the city was submerged when the Tiber river flooded again. But both many 
 things and statues which were in the Pantheon were stuck by lightening, so that the spear 
 even fell from the hand of Augustus. Being affected therefore both by disease and 
 famine, for in the whole of Italy the disease spread and no one worked the land and I 
 think that in the lands beyond the same thing spread, the Romans concurred believing 
 that it happened for no other reason to them but that Augustus was not consul at that     
 time.” 
 
Given the circumstances, it is probable that the Tiber’s flood and its destruction of grain reserves 
caused the crisis rather than the disease.81 Whatever the cause of the crisis, the people responded 
with violent demands for Augustus to assume the dictatorship and the cura annonae. According 
to Cassius Dio, the people even threatened to burn down the Curia and the senate (Cass. Dio. 
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of refuse and remains, the epidemic would have a limited effect on agricultural production. By this period, Rome 
imported the majority of its grain supply from outside of Italy, the epicenter of the epidemic. While Cassius Dio 
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His. Rom. 54.1). Popular outcry therefore crushed Augustus’ attempt to restore the authority of 
the Senate. 
Remembering this threat to his constitutional settlement, Augustus records his response 
in his Res Gestae: 
Dictaturam et apsenti et praesenti mihi delatam et a populo et a senatu, M. Marcello et L. 
 Arruntio consulibus non accepi. Non recusavi in summa frumenti penuria curationem 
 annonae, quam ita administravi, ut intra paucos dies metu et periclo praesenti populum 
 universum liberarem impensa et cura mea (15). 
 
In the consulship of Marcus Marcellus and Lucius Arruntius [23 BCE], I did not accept 
the dictatorship offered to me both absent and present by both the people and Senate. I 
did not refuse in the greatest scarcity of food the care of grain, which I so administered 
that I freed the whole people from the present fear and danger by my expenditure and 
concern. 
  
Since the dictatorship of Julius Caesar, who was killed twenty years prior, would have lived in 
popular memory, Augustus’ acceptance of the dictatorship would signal his insincerity in the 
constitutional settlement of 27 BCE. Augustus would then become less able to continue the 
“republicanizing” reforms necessary to accomplish his goals. By contrast, Augustus could save 
his constitutional settlement from popular pressure if he accepted the cura annonae. Augustus 
could point to Pompey’s cura annonae in 67 BCE as a republican precedent for his temporary 
cura (Cass. Dio. His. Rom. 54.1). Accepting the cura annonae, Augustus purchased and 
distributed some twelve rations of grain with the help of his successor, Tiberius, to ease the 
immediate crisis.82 Furthermore, Augustus ordered that the Senate choose two people among 
former praetors to oversee the distribution of grain (Cass. Dio. His. Rom. 54.1). Despite his best 
efforts to pass the annona to the Senate, Augustus found annona back in his court.  
Since the Senate proved itself too weak to administer annona, Augustus again attempted 
to support its authority with further imperial aid and reforms in 18 BCE. While none of the three 
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imperial historians record popular unrest in 18 BCE, Augustus appears to act to counter a 
potential food crisis from shortfalls of tax grain. As Augustus records in his Res Gestae: 
Inde ab eo anno, quo Cn. et P. Lentuli consules fuerunt, cum deficerent vectigalia, tum 
 centum millibus hominum tum pluribus multo frumentarias et nummariás tesseras ex aere 
 et patrimonio meo dedi (18). 
 
From that year, in which Gnaeus and Publius Lentulus were consuls onwards, whenever 
 the taxes were deficient, I gave out of my granary and patrimony grain and money tickets 
 sometimes to one-hundred thousand men, sometimes to many more.  
 
Beyond short-term imperial aid, Augustus made several long-term reforms. Augustus increased 
the quantity and quality of the ex-praetor assistants for grain distribution, choosing four recent 
ex-praetors instead of two somewhat recent ex-praetors (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 54.17). To support 
the work of  praefecti frumenti dandi ex s.c., as the ex-praetors would come to be known, 
Augustus established other new offices to maintain infrastructure necessary for the annona: the 
public buildings of Rome and the Tiber river channel (Suet. Div. Aug. 37).83 Around this time, 
Augustus experimented with a different method of distribution to ease the logistics of the 
annona. Rather than hand out grain month by month, Augustus attempted to give four months of 
grain thrice per year. 84 On the demand of the people, however, Augustus returned to the previous 
practice (Sue. Div. Aug. 40).85  Although unable to change the distribution of annona, Augustus 
was able to return authority to the Senate until the crisis of 6 CE. 
After the crisis of 6 CE, Augustus gave up on his attempts to strengthen the Senate’s 
authority over annona with imperial aid. In the later months of 5 CE, the Tiber River again 
flooded away part of Rome’s grain reserves, spoiling them with rot (Cass. Dio 55.22). Since 
                                                          
83 For the evolution of titles for these ex-praetor grain officals, see Rickman 1980:180. 
84 Suetonius explains that Augustus sought to reduce the disruption of grain distribution on the business of the 
plebs. Even if Augustus offered this explanation in public, Augustus would have considered in private its logistical 
effects on grain distribution after the crisis of 23 BCE. With fewer distributions, the Senate could schedule the 
annona distributions around the major shipments of grain.  
85 Since the reform of Augustus would have meant that a pleb had to carry 60 pounds of wheat instead of 15 round 
the streets of Rome to their apartments, one can understand the popular desire for monthly distributions. 
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Cassius Dio offers no further comment, the Senate and its agents, praefecti frumenti dandi ex s.c, 
seem to have managed the crisis of 5 CE without any complications. Despite its show of strength 
in 5 CE, the Senate would prove unable to handle the severe supply crisis of 6 CE due to 
insufficient tax revenue. 86 Inflamed by major urban fires and by new taxation, the Roman people 
pondered revolution by day and published revolutionary bulletins by night as the crisis deepened 
(Cass. Dio Rom. His. 55.27). In this turbulent time, Augustus responded with radical acts: 
ὥσθ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τούς τε μονομαχοῦντας καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα τὰ ὤνια ὑπὲρ πεντήκοντα καὶ 
 ἑπτακοσίους σταδίους ἐξωσθῆναι, ἔκ τε τῆς θεραπείας καὶ τὸν Αὔγουστον καὶ τοὺς 
 ἄλλους τὸ πλεῖον ἀποπέμψασθαι, καὶ δικῶν ἀνοχὰς γενέσθαι, ἐκδημεῖν τε τοῖς 
 βουλευταῖς  ἔνθα ἂν ἐθελήσωσιν ἐπιτραπῆναι. καὶ ὅπως γ᾽ ἂν μηδὲν ἐκ τούτου τὰ 
 δόγματα ἐμποδίζηται, κύρια πάντα τὰ γιγνωσκόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων εἶναι 
 ἐκελεύσθη. καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἄνδρες ὑπατευκότες ἐπί τε τοῦ σίτου καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄρτου 
 κατέστησαν, ὥστε τακτὸν ἑκάστῳ πιπράσκεσθαι. ἐπέδωκε μὲν γὰρ καὶ προῖκα ὁ 
 Αὔγουστος τοῖς σιτοδοτουμένοις τοσοῦτον ἕτερον ὅσον ἀεὶ ἐλάμβανον: ὡς δ᾽ οὐδὲ 
 ἐκεῖνό σφισιν ἐξήρκεσεν, οὐδὲ ἐς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ γενέθλια δημοσίᾳ αὐτοὺς ἑστιαθῆναι  
  εἴασεν (55.26). 
 
As a consequence, the gladiators and the slaves for sale were forced out seven-hundred 
  and fifty stades [around 86.18 miles]. Augustus and the other men sent away from 
 themselves the greater part of their retinues. There was also a recess of courts. Augustus 
  and the others were willing then to permit even for senators to be abroad, and so that no 
 one out of this might impede public legislation, it was ordered that all the judgements of 
 the men always present were valid.  And besides Augustus and the others appointed ex-
 consuls over the grain and bread supply as to sell a fixed quantity to each. Augustus 
 indeed contributed as a gift to the men being provisioned so much in every case as they 
 had received. But since it did not suffice for them, he did not even allow public feasts to 
 be held on his birthday.87 
 
After Augustus had invested over thirty years of his reign to restore the institutions of Rome, the 
courts, the markets, and the Senate, he sacrificed all of them to alleviate the grain crisis of 6 CE.  
                                                          
86 Since Cassius Dio names no cause for the new crisis, I would assume insufficient tax revenue from the provinces. 
After the severe flood of 5 CE, a second severe flood seems unlikely. While Cassius Dio mentions a fire in the same 
year, the design of the horreae or storehouses would make them fire-resistant. For more on horreae design, see 
Rickman 1977: 117-122.  
87 Compare to Suetonius Div. Aug. 42.3. Suetonius adds the expulsion of foreigners. 
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Even if Augustus would revoke his radical actions in the spring of 7 CE, the crisis of 6 
CE represents the seed of his future annona policy. As Suetonius records in his Divus Augustus, 
Augustus expressed in a lost work how after the crisis:  
Impetum se cepisse scribit frumentationes publicas in perpetuum abolendi, quod earum 
 fiducia cultura agrorum cessaret; neque tamen perseverasse, quia certum haberet posse 
  per ambitionem quandoque restitui (42) 
 
An urge for abolishing the public distributions in perpetuity seized me, because for the 
 trust in them the cultivation of the fields ceased. I did not however persist because I 
 thought that the public distributions are certain to be able to be revived at any time 
 through a desire for popular favor.  
 
Even if Augustus could not recognize how the merchants rather than the farmers suffered the 
primary impact of his previous policy, his recognition transformed his public policy around 
annona.88 Augustus no longer “bailed out” the Senate and its public grain distributions with 
imperial aid as in 23 and 18 BCE.89 Augustus instead regulated annona and its public 
distributions not only for the customers but for the producers (Sue. Div. Aug. 42). In the process 
of this public initiative, Augustus consolidated more power into his private hands. 
 Despite his radical acts of 6 CE, Rome fell again into the supply crisis of 7 CE, spurring 
Augustus to a permanent solution. To satisfy the still restive populace, Augustus appointed two 
                                                          
88 By 6 CE, if a farmer was close enough to Rome to sell his produce there himself, the farmer would have grown 
fruit or other non-transportable commodities to take advantage of high urban prices (Morely 1996: 83-107). Other 
farmers would only experience the impact of public grain distributions and its downward pressure on the grain 
price of Rome indirectly through the negotiatores or the private grain merchants. As Augustus distributed free 
grain, he reduced the potential profits of the negotiatores from high prices. Erdkamp 2005: 148-150. 
89 In his Res Gestae, Augustus mentions no personal contributions to the state or its people after his donation to 
the aerarium militare, the military treasury, in 6 CE. While Cassius Dio shares the silence of Augustus, he adds 
several notes about new taxation necessary to replace his previous personal contributions. See 55.24 for how 
Augustus passed his five percent estate tax in 6 CE, 55.31 for how he got his two percent slave sales tax in 8 CE, 
and 56.28 for how Augustus imposed a five percent property tax after the Senate protested his estate tax in 13 CE. 
To justify his taxation, Augustus of course pointed to the cost of his old soldiers and new security forces. While 
these arguments from silence cannot be conclusive, the silence is suggestive, especially in the Res Gestae. Since 
Augustus attempts to establish a narrative for his reign, how Augustus and his service to the Republic makes his  
reign an exemplum for the future, Augustus would desire to mention any gift to the Roman people to magnify his  
virtue of liberalitas. For an excellent summary of the purpose and context of the Res Gestae, see Harrison 2013: 4-
12. For its Republican idiom, see Hodgson 2014. 
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ex-consuls curators of the grain supply (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 55.31). Using their lictors and the 
broad authority, the curators seem to have stabilized the annona of Rome, even if not quite for 
Italy.90 Despite the short-term success of the curators, Augustus, who was now over seventy 
years old, sought a solution for the annona able to survive his death.  Sometime between 9 and 
11 CE, Augustus appointed the equestrian Gaius Turranius the first permanent imperial 
praefectus annonae.91 Until the third century CE, the praefectus annonae and his staff would 
maintain the de facto cura annonae of the emperors on their behalf, working with a web of 
public and private agents to ensure the annona.92 In the process, the praefectus created market 
regulations, judged legal cases, and traded the emperor’s personal grain supply.93 After the death 
of Augustus, the praefectus annonae became part of Tiberius’ imperial inheritance.  
Despite his initial attempt to “republicanize” the annona, Tiberius continued the 
praefectus annonae and the legacy of Augustus. Once Tiberius secured his reign against its 
major threats in 16 CE, Tiberius tried to return his authority over the annona to the Senate in his 
broader restoration of “Republican” norms.94 When Tiberius restored the sumptuary laws of the 
Republic to combat excessive expenditures, censuit annonamque macelli senatus arbitratu 
                                                          
90 In 9 CE, Cassius Dio explains that a food crisis occurred within Italy because of the war against the Dalmatians. 
Given the geography of the region and its impact on commerce, the effects of the war would concentrate in the Po 
River Valley and the rest of eastern Italy. Both eastern Italy and Dalmatia (modern Croatia) rest along the Adriatic 
Sea. Since the Adriatic Sea as a narrow, shallow gulf offered harsh conditions to ships with few safe harbors, few 
outside grain merchants would have imported grain into the region, even when the presence of the Roman army 
increased demand for grain (Erdkamp 2005: 188).  Without imports, the Roman army and its procurement would 
have decreased supplies and increased prices to crisis levels. Contrary to the suggestion of Peter Garnsey, the 
consumers of Rome would have suffered minimal effects from the campaign against the Dalmatians and the 
Germans (Garnsey 1988: 222). 
91 Since Cassius Dio’s narrative breaks down between 9 and 11 CE, Peter Garnsey presumes that the missing 
sections would include an explication of the first praefectus annonae’s appointment (Garnsey 1988: 222). In 14 CE, 
Tacitus after all explains how the Gaius Turranius and his fellow prefect Seius Strabo pledged their loyalty to 
Tiberius in the presence of consuls  Sextus Pompeius and Sextus Apuleius (Ann. 1.7). 
92 Rickman 1980: 92-3. 
93 Rickman 1980: 80-2. 
94 Suetonius records his operations against the mutinies of his German and Illyrian soldiers, the conspiracy of 
Senator Lucius Scriboneus Libo, and the revolt of Clemens (Tib. 25) 
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quotannis temperandam, dato aedilibus negotio popinas ganeasque usque eo inhibendi, ut ne 
opera quidem pistoria proponi venalia sinerent (Sue. Tib. 34), “[Tiberius] proposed that annona 
should be checked every year by the decision of the Senate, with the duty given to the aediles for 
prohibiting the cook shops and eating-houses always from that time not to allow pastries to be 
exposed for sale.”95 In the face of crisis, however, Tiberius held to his Augustan legacy of 
imperial control. When the people protested high prices in 19 CE, Tiberius imposed a maximum 
price on the annona subsidizing merchants 2 sesterces per modii (Tac. Ann. 2.87). His subsidy 
reflects his post-Augustan awareness of the need to make the grain trade worthwhile. When the 
people protested high prices in 32 CE, however, Tiberius critiqued the magistrates and the Senate 
for their inability to control the protestors rather than the annona (Tac. Ann. 6.13). Moreover, the 
implementation of their decisions remained in the hands of the emperor and his praefectus 
annonae. Curiously, the original praefectus, the equestrian Gaius Turranius, would serve until 48 
CE, when Claudius forced an unhappy ninety year Turranius into his retirement (Tac. Ann. 
11.31; Sen. De Brev. Vi. 18).96 Unlike Claudius, Tiberius’s successor Caligula was happy to let 
Turranius manage the annona. 
 In spite of Turranius’ involvement, Caligula almost caused a complete disruption of 
annona with his reckless requisitions of its public and private infrastructure. Since Caligula 
wished for a famine or another fine disaster to make his reign unforgettable, according to 
Suetonius, Caligula was apt to misappropriate the infrastructure of the annona for his own 
amusement (Cal. 31). In two years of his reign, Caligula squandered thrifty Tiberius’ 2.3 to 3.3 
billion sesterces surplus on his pet projects (Cass. Dio His. Rom. 2). Unwilling to curtail his 
projects, Caligula terrorized Rome in his effort to cut ordinary costs and to raise extraordinary 
                                                          
95 For the Republican heritage of sumptuary laws, see Dari-Mattiacci and Pliseck: 2010. 
96 Turranius was so unhappy to retire Seneca reports that his whole household wept for him until Claudius restored 
Turranius to his post. 
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revenue. When Caligula wished to control his ordinary cost for public grain, he closed the 
granaries on occasion without concern for the people (Sue. Cal. 26). Similarly, Caligula seized 
the work animals from the bakers once when he sought to sell the memorabilia of Augustus and 
Tiberius to the people of Gaul (Sue. Cal. 39). Using his hard-conned funds, Caligula in the third 
year of his reign (39 CE) even bridged 3.3 miles of the Bay of Naples with a double band of 
merchant ships, out-aggrandizing Xerxes and his Hellespont bridge (Sue. Cal. 19; Cass. Dio 
Rom. His. 59.17). Between all of the disruptions, tenacious Turranius could scarcely sustain the 
annona. As Seneca suggests, Rome only possessed seven or eight days of provisions on the eve 
of Caligula’s death in January of 41 CE (De Brev. Vi. 18). After four years of Caligula’ regime, a 
crisis would compel his successor, Claudius, to intervene into the annona further. 
To restore the annona after the reckless reign of Caligula, Claudius subsumed authority 
over the port of Ostia and the taxation code to himself and his officials. When Caligula 
appropriated their ships for his bridge in 39 CE, he reduced the number of negotiatores on the 
annona. In his appropriation, Caligula removed around 290 ships from the annona and from 
other trades.97 Beyond the initial reduction, Caligula’s action discouraged other negotiatores 
from the annona, since Caligula had made the trade more risky with the new possibility of 
political seizure. With fewer negotiatores, Claudius faced a severe food crisis in 42 CE. To 
remedy the crisis in the short-run, Claudius subsidized winter-voyages for the remaining 
negotiatores; in the longer-run, Claudius constructed the Portus of Ostia at great expense (Cass. 
Dio Rom. His. 60.11).98 With the Portus, Claudius created the first harbor for the city of Rome. 
                                                          
97 Assuming an average ship length of 120 feet, Caligula would have removed 290 ships for his two rows of ships. 
From Cassius Dio’s description, however, Caligula constructed some of the ships for the occasion so Caligula might 
have removed fewer ships from the fleet (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 59.17). To give some context, modern archaeologists 
have only discovered around 190 shipwrecks from the 1st century CE (Parker 2008: 187)  
98 Cassius Dio records a food crisis in 42 CE unparalleled in Suetonius. In his account, Cassius Dio fails to mention 
any short-term response to the crisis of 42 CE. Given the necessity to relieve the short-term crisis, Peter Garnsey 
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Since Rome could offer the negotiatores a safer anchorage than the river mouth of Ostia with 
less risk to storm loss, Claudius could attract more negotiatores to supply the annona, especially 
in the winter. In 44 CE, Claudius subsumed the authority of Senate over the port of Ostia to little 
protest, replacing its appointee the quaestor Ostiensis with his own procurator annonae (Cass. 
Dio Rom. His. 60.24).99 Despite his new authority over Ostia, Claudius required still more 
authority to respond to the crisis of 51 CE. 
In the food crisis of 51 CE, Claudius subsumed tax authority from the Senate to attract 
more negotiatores. Since the provincial droughts of 51 CE had prevented the negotiatores from 
the procurement of enough grain for the entire year, Rome possessed only some fifteen days’ 
worth of grain in the middle of winter (Sue. Div. Claud. 13; Tac. Ann. 12.43). In Book 12 of his 
Annales, Tacitus records the popular response: nec occulti tantum questus, sed iura reddentem 
Claudium circumvasere clamoribus turbidis, pulsumque in extremam fori partem vi urgebant, 
donec militum globo infensos perrupit, “And the complaints were not hidden, but the people 
beset Claudius on all sides with a confused clamor while he administered justice and were 
pushing him beaten into a far part of the forum with violence until he broke through the hostile 
men with a sphere of soldiers” (43). Given his fright, Claudius sought to stabilize the annona 
with more grain by any means necessary. Since his second major infrastructure project to drain 
the Fucine Lake failed, Claudius would not attempt another (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 60.11). 
Lacking the desire (or the ability) to create and operate his own merchant ships, Claudius 
subsidized the negotiatores to supply the annona in response to the immediate crisis and 
afterwards. Immediately, Claudius assumed any loss from winter voyages of negotiatores in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
assumes that Claudius relieved the crisis in the manner of 51 CE (Garnsey 1988: 223). Without the Portus, 
however, Claudius would have found the arrangement of winter shipments difficult, since according to Cassius 
Dio’s comment the winter storms would have wrecked ships outside of Rome. In spite of this, I believe Garnsey’s 
assumption the best available. 
99 See Rickman 1980:222 for more information about the administration of Ostia and Portus.  
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annona trade (Sue. Div. Claud. 19). While his effort stimulated trade in the short-run, the policy 
proved too expensive to sustain in the long-run as the negotiatores took advantage of the subsidy 
to sink their old ships for the “insurance money.” Instead, Claudius would give out tax 
exemptions and other special rights to every person with a merchant ship (Sue. Div. Claud. 19). 
Male citizens could avoid the “bachelor penalty” of the lex Papia Poppaea; females the 
traditional limitations on inheritance. Since Claudius consulted the Senate on none of these 
measures, Claudius assumed the traditional Senatorial authority over taxation.  
Over his fourteen year reign, Nero would subsume any remaining authority of the Senate 
over the annona. During his tax reforms in 58 CE, Nero would continue to subsume the tax 
authority of Senate for the promotion of annona. In addition to their previous privileges, Nero 
allowed negotiatores to exclude their merchant ships from their taxable property (Tac. Ann. 
13.51).  Given the tax exemption, enough people invested in new merchant ships to reduce the 
price of shipments across the marine provinces. Despite the success of his tax reforms, Nero 
found himself in the midst of a potential supply crisis in 62 CE. In the fire and the storm that 
year, Rome lost three hundred grain ships. Due to anxiety over the Parthian War, Nero would 
have faced a popular revolt had not he in a false confidence tossed moldy public grain reserves 
into the Tiber (Tac. Ann. 15.18). Even if only Tacitus of the three major historians tells this tall 
tale, where an imperial trick can disappear the destruction of 300 ships and its effects on the 
annona, his account suggests the increase of imperial influence, even over the distributions.100  
After the Great Fire of 64 CE, however, Nero would burn away the rest of the Senate’s 
annona authority.  In this inferno, the city of Rome suffered a disaster unparalleled since the 
floods and famines of 6 CE. As Suetonius describes, per sex dies septemque noctes ea clade 
saevitum est ad monumentorum bustorumque deversoria plebe compulsa (Nero 38), “For six 
                                                          
100 Garnsey 1988:223.  
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days and seven nights the city was raged with this destruction, while the people were driven to 
the lodgings of monuments and tombs.” While Augustus responded to his crisis with the 
temporary appointment of an extraordinary commission of ex-consuls, Nero assumed emergency 
control for himself and his officials over the annona. To maintain his maximum grain price of 3 
sesterces per modius, Nero expedited grain shipments from the granaries of Ostia and Puteoli. In 
addition, Tacitus reports that Nero also suspended the free public grain distributions of the 
annona for the first time in the Principate (Tac. Ann. 15.39). In 64-66 CE, Nero would advertise 
his personal control over the annona with his issues of the Annona-Ceres sesterius.101 While a 
special shipment of grain from the province of Moesia ended the immediate crisis of 64 CE, 
Nero held on to his emergency powers. 
From 64 to 68 CE, Nero employed his power over the annona to secure his weakening 
political support. In 65 CE, Nero put down the Pisonian Conspiracy. According to Tacitus, 
influential senator Gaius Calpurnius Piso conspired with Praetorian Prefect Faenius Rufus to 
become emperor with the help of the Praetorian Guard (Ann. 15.50).102 Since Nero saw the need 
to buy the loyalty of the Praetorian Guard, Nero granted each praetorian guardsmen two 
thousand sesterces and free public grain distributions each month (Tac. Ann. 15.72; Sue. Nero 
10).  In 64 CE, Nero endeavored to ease navigation to Rome with one or the other canal projects. 
In Suetonius’ account, Nero only “intended,” destinarat,, to construct a series of short canals to 
cut through the bends of the Tiber River channel (Nero 16). In Tacitus’ account, however, Nero 
and his engineers attempted to construct a more than 100 mile canal overland between Lake 
Avernus and Ostia in their hubris (Ann. 15.42). In spite of Nero’s love of the impossible, Tacitus 
reports how Nero abandoned the project after a few initial canal works. Whichever canal project 
                                                          
101 Rickman 1980: 261. 
102 For a detailed analysis of the Pisonian Conspiracy and Tacitus’ narrative, see Pagan 2004: 76-89. 
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Nero attempted to advance, his consideration of expensive canals reflects his concern for the 
annona and for his popular support.  
Despite his earlier efforts, Nero alienated his popular support with his mismanagement of 
the annona. In 68 CE, Senator Vindex of Gaul started a rebellion against Nero to stop his 
plunder of Gaul for his plays and other pet projects (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 63.22; Sue. Nero 40). 
When Galba and his Spanish legions joined the rebellion, Nero faced one of the most serious 
rebellions in the history of the Principate. Even if Nero had paid no attention to rebellion at first, 
since Nero preferred to speak to the Senate about his nifty new water organ, the desertion of 
Rubrius Gallus and his Legio I Italica, First Italian Legion, made Nero panic about his previous 
preparations (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 63.27; Sue. Nero 41). After Nero attempted unsuccessfully to 
mobilize the Roman citizenry, Nero drafted the slaves of the wealthy and demanded 
contributions of everyone (Sue. Nero 44). Distracted by war collections, Nero neglected to 
manage the annona. As Suetonius recounts, Ex annonae quoque caritate lucranti adcrevit 
invidia; nam et forte accidit, ut in publica fame Alexandrina navis nuntiaretur pulverem 
luctatoribus aulicis advexisse (Nero 45), “Out of the dearness of annona, hatred arose for the 
profiteer; for it even perhaps happened that in a public famine a ship from Alexandria was said to 
carry dust for the imperial wrestlers.”103 As scholar Gwyn Morgan explains, since Nero 
purchased grain to feed his soldiers in his preparations against Galba too fast, Nero created a 
dearth of grain on the market. 104 When fewer people than expected joined his army, Nero sold 
some of his surplus grain to the public for high prices. Nero thereby gained some coin but lost 
any support from the plebeians. Seeing Nero’s loss of popular and military support, the Senate 
shifted its support to Galba (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 63.27; Sue. Nero 49). With the help of his sole 
                                                          
103 Curiously, Cassius Dio does not recount this story in his shortened account of the fall of Nero. Even so, 
Suetonius’ account remains believable since Cassius Dio seems to follow Suetonius’ account in other respects. 
104 Morgan 2000: 222. 
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friend, his secretary Epaphroditus, Nero killed himself. The death of Nero dispelled any illusion 
of the emperors about the political importance of the annona. 
After the conservative management of the Flavian dynasty (69-96 CE), the emperors of 
the later Principate (96-235 CE) would expand the annona to augment their popular support. In 
69 CE, Vespasian vaporized his opposition to become the first emperor of the Flavian dynasty 
(69-96 CE). Given the silence of the literary record about the annona, Vespasian and Titus seem 
to have made the annona work without major new measures, even despite the disruptions of 
Mount Vesuvius’s eruption in 79 CE and the Roman fire of 80 CE (Sue. Div. Titus 8; Cass. Dio 
Rom His. 21-4).105 Thanks to the confiscations of Nero, Vespasian and Titus controlled an even  
more substantial portion of grain production in North Africa and Egypt through the patrimonium 
imperii, reducing their dependence on the negotiatores.106After the rebellion of Lucius Antonius 
in 89 CE, however, Domitian experienced the first shortage of grain in the Flavian dynasty (Sue. 
Dom. 7). While Domitian had declared an edict to prohibit the creation of new vineyards in Italy 
and to uproot half of the provincial vineyards, popular criticism caused Domitian to prune back  
his plans (Sue. Dom. 7 and 14). Even if Domitian did restore the customary public banquets of 
Claudius instead of the gift baskets of Nero, sportula, to woo the people, Domitian seems 
                                                          
105 While Emperor Titus had bad enough luck to suffer two major disasters, the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and of 
a Roman fire, both disasters could have caused far worse impacts to annona. For Mount Vesuvius, had the wind 
blown northwest to Puteoli instead of southeast toward Pompeii, the ash of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius would 
have destroyed the year’s grain ships from Alexandria and North Africa. Despite the Portus’ construction in 42 CE, 
the larger Alexandrian and North African vessels still docked in Puteoli for its safer harbor (Rickman 1980: 19). 
Since Mount Vesuvius erupted during the March-October shipping season, on August 24th, some ships would be in 
harbor, including North African grain vessels. Had the fire of 80 CE headed to the Emporium district, the location of 
the horrae, instead of the Capitoline Hill and the Campus Martius. Despite his luck, it is hard to conceive that Titus 
and his urban authorities did not impose some emergency market controls to stop the supply hording (Cass. Dio 
Rom. His. 23). 
106 According to Pliny the Younger, Nero acquired half of the land through his confiscation of six large Senatorial 
estates (Pliny Nat. His. 18.35). Even if Pliny the Younger exaggerates, Rickman notes how an inscription of Hadrian 
cites the expansion of saltus Neronianus, the Neroian plain, from multiple earlier estates (Rickman 1980: 111). 
While less dramatic than in North Africa, Nero consolidated imperial lands in Egypt. For a full account, see 
Parassoglou 1978. 
 Ruter 42 
 
otherwise to have maintained the annona arrangements of his successors. While the annona of 
the Flavians satisfied the Roman people, the next dynasty of emperors were hungry for reforms. 
 After Nerva’s “republicanizing” reforms, the Antonine dynasty of emperors (98-192 CE) 
expanded the annona to augment their popular support. In his short reign (96-98 CE), Nerva 
attempted once more to “republicanize” the administration of the Principate. Nerva restored the 
Senate’s power and property after the seizures of Domitian (Cass. Dio Rom. His. 67.2). Given his 
republican leanings, Nerva sought to reduce the influence of the emperor and his control of the 
annona .  Nerva therefore worked with the Senate to resettle poor Romans across Italy on 60 
million sesterces of land, following the precedent of the Gracchi brothers and Julius Caesar 
(Cass. Dio Rom. His. 67.2). After the mutiny of Casperius Aelianus and his Praetorian 
Guardsmen in 98 CE, Nerva appointed Trajan as his successor. With Trajan, a new era of 
annona would dawn. 
Unlike Nerva, the Antonines expanded the control of the emperor over the annona to 
secure public support in Italy and the provinces. Since the high price of bread concerned the 
people, Trajan increased public supervision of the bakers and millers, organizing them into a 
guild, the corpus pistorum, for the first time.107 Using the corpus pistorum, Trajan and his 
successors could better direct subsidies and privileges toward bakers. To gain the goodwill of the 
people, Trajan granted grain to 5,000 boys among the cities of Italy. Later Antoninus Pius and 
Marcus Aurelius would create similar programs to feed the boys and girls of Italy (Cass. Dio 
Rom. His. 68.14; Plin. Pan. 26-8).108 Likewise, Trajan and his successors would aid the 
provinces through their own food crises. When the flood of the Nile failed in 99 CE, Trajan 
relieved the famine of Egypt from the Egyptian grain reserves of Rome (Pan. 32). According to 
                                                          
107 Erdkamp 2005: 253. 
108 Rickman 1980: 184. 
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their biographers, Hadrian, Antoninus Pious, and Marcus Aurelius continued Trajan’s tradition 
of provincial aid (SHA Hadr. 21.5; Ant. Pius 8.11; Marc. 8.4-5).  To sustain his aid programs, 
Trajan had to increase the capacity of the port of Ostia to receive and store grain. Trajan 
therefore constructed a new hexagonal inner harbor and storage complex within the Portus of 
Claudius.109 Thanks to the harbor of Trajan, the largest grain ships from Alexandria and North 
Africa could by-pass Puteoli on their journey to Rome. After the competent management of 
“Five Good Emperors,” the sixth emperor of the Nerva-Antonine dynasty, Commodus, lost his 
reign to his inability to control either his own ego or the city’s grain supply.110  
I conclude that during the Principate (27 BCE-235 CE) Augustus and his successors 
subsumed the traditional authority of the Senate over the annona to ensure popular support. 
While Augustus restored this traditional authority to Senate in his Constitutional Settlement in 27 
BCE and sustained it in the grain shortages of 23 BCE and 18 BCE, Augustus reversed his policy 
after the severe shortage of 6 CE. Between 10 and 14 CE, Augustus appointed the first 
permanent praefectus annonae, an imperial official, to manage the annona on the emperor’s 
behalf. Despite his “republicanization” campaign, Tiberius did not dismiss the praefectus 
annonae and restore the Senate’s administration of the annona. Without the intervention of the 
Senate, then, Caligula destabilized the annona with his reckless disregard. In his restoration of 
stability, Claudius subsumed the Senate’s taxation and port authority for his officials. After Nero 
lost his reign because of his mismanagement of the annona, the Flavian dynasty (69-96 CE) 
continued the annona without any radical changes. Despite Nerva’s “republicanizing” reforms, 
the Antonine dynasty of emperors (98-192 CE) expanded the annona to secure their popular 
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support. Having documented how the emperors subsumed the traditional authority of the Senate, 
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Conclusion: A Grain of Truth 
 Augustus and his successors subsumed the traditional authority of the Senate over 
annona to stabilize popular support for the Principate, developing a new infrastructure and 
imperial bureaucracy for its delivery. While the Senate and its optimates defended its traditional 
authority over the annona to maintain its control of political life throughout the Roman Republic 
(509-27 BCE), the Senate unwilling and unable to systemize the distribution and oversight of the 
annona lost control to the consilium plebis and its populares. Due to the weaknesses of ancient 
agriculture and logistics, short supplies of grain often threatened starvation in the ancient world. 
In this threat, political leaders found an opportunity to secure their popular support. Before the 
Punic Wars, the Roman Senate managed the annona with only ad hoc shipments of grain. While 
the economic dislocations and transformation of the Punic and Macedonian Wars compelled a 
more systematic approach to the annona, the Senate did not employ its authority out of its own 
self-interest. Instead, the consilium plebis and its reigning populares led the way to reform in 
their pursuit of plebeian support. While the Senate resisted the first wave of reform under the 
Gracchi brothers 133-123 BCE with assassination and appropriation, until the Senate repealed 
their laws entirely, the Senate yielded to the second wave of reform under Pompey and Clodius 
Pulcher 67-57 BCE, unable to administer the annona. To sustain these popular reforms, Pompey 
and Caesar in turn created systems to manage the annona. 
 Augustus and his successors in the Principate (27 BCE-235 CE) created a new imperial 
system to support the annona. While Augustus restored and sustained the traditional authority of 
the Senate over grain distribution until 6 BCE, Augustus appointed the first praefectus annonae, 
the first element of an imperial system. Despite his “republicanization” campaign, Tiberius 
expanded the imperial system of Augustus to the point that his successor Caligula and his 
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disregard destabilized the annona. In his restoration of stability, Claudius subsumed the Senate’s 
taxation and port authority for his officials. After Nero lost his reign partly because of his 
mismanagement of the annona, the Flavian dynasty (69-96 CE) continued the annona without 
any radical changes. Despite Nerva’s “republicanizing” reforms, the Antonine dynasty of 
emperors (98-192 CE) expanded the annona to secure their popular support. The Severan 
dynasty (193-235 CE) would continue the annona without any note in the literary record until 
the fall of Severus Alexander in 235 CE.  
 From my study of the annona, I propose a new perspective on the transition between the 
Republic and the Principate.  Each of the big three imperial historians account for the Principate 
in terms of personal politics and preferences of the “great man” Augustus (Div. Aug. 28; Rom. 
His. 52.1; Ann. 1.2). By contrast, I argue that the Principate represents the long-term political 
result of growing social inequality in Rome. From an equalitarian society of yodel-men farmers 
and shepherds in the 2nd BCE, Rome had evolved into an unequal society by the 2nd CE, where 
the top 11.15% controlled an estimated 40% of the national income.111 As income inequality 
arose, the competition between rich and poor, the optimates and populares, over the bounty of 
the Empire paralyzed the politics of the Roman Republic. In the deadlock of the late Republic, 
the Senate proved unwilling or unable to respond to the new needs of Rome and its extensive 
empire. Deadlock devolved into deadly civil war. To rebuild the Roman state from its ruin, 
Augustus and his successors created the Principate and its governance institutions on the basis of 
“Republican” precedent. Since Augustus could not equalize the distribution of wealth and power 
between the Emperor and his Senators, the Principate proved provisional.  
By the same social inequality, the Principate transformed into the Dominate (195-476 
CE). “Bad” emperors like Caligula and Nero exploited the inequality to impose their whims on 
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the political system over the Senate. “Good” emperors expanded imperial authority and 
bureaucracy to address the effects of the “bad” emperors. By the Dominate, the emperors could 
rule with their imperial bureaucracy without the assistance of Senate. While the decline of 
Rome’s importance and population made the annona less of a concern than before for the 
emperors, emperors reorganized the annona in the 4th century CE to impose state control on the 
negotiatores, the last private agent in the annona.112 By the 5th century, the annona ceased 
unable to import grain from Vandal-occupied North Africa. 
 But what can the contemporary world learn from the annona? Its improvements in 
communication and transportation render the logistical lessons of the annona obsolete. Modern 
corporations do with little to no inventory, the primary tool of the long-lived first praefectus 
annonae Gaius Terrentius.113 Despite its obsolete logistics, the annona can reveal to the world 
the importance of a contemporary problem: income inequality. As I write, the top quintile of the 
United States earns around 50% of the national income, comparable to the top quintile of the 
Roman world in the second century CE.114 While the Romans could not address inequality 
unaware of it and its impacts, the United States still can before inequality transforms its political 
system. Even if the forces of globalization and the “winner-take-most” knowledge economy 
make higher income inequality difficult to deflect, the United States can still change its policy to 
promote opportunity for the middle class with better education and healthcare.115 May the history 
of the annona prove profitable. 
 
 
                                                          
112 Rickman 1980: 200. 
113 Cox 2011: 1. 
114 DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014: 30. 
115 Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Ricka, Suphaphiphat, and Tsounta 2015: 3. 
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Appendix I: Grain Provinces 
  
Bible History Online. “Roman Empire at its Greatest Extent.” 
In the late Roman Republic (ca 150-27 BCE), Africa and Sicily supplied the annona. In the 
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Appendix II: Roman Trade Routes 
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Appendix III: Annona Organizational Charts 
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Annona in the Early to Middle of the Roman Republic (509-133 BCE) 
492 BCE: The Senate assumes 
authority over the annona after the 
Succession of the Plebs. 
509 BCE: Having expelled King 
Tarquinius Superbus, Lucius Brutus 
establishes the Roman Republic. 
439 BCE: Praefectus Annonae Lucius 
Minucius persuades the Senate to 
appoint Cincinnatus dictator to slay 
equestrian grain-benefactor Spurius 
Maelius, confirming the Senate’s 
authority over the annona. 
264-241 BCE: First Punic War 
218-201 BCE: Second Punic War 
149-146 BCE: Third Punic War 
172-168 BCE: Third Macedonian War 
200-196 BCE: Second Macedonian War 
264-146 BCE: Economic and Social 
Dislocations of Foreign Wars 
Small farmers abandon the 
countryside for Rome; Senators and 
equestrians accumulate large 
latifundia. 
133 BCE: The tribune Tiberius 
Gracchus passes his lex Sempronia 
agaria to resettle poor Romans on 
the ager publicus. 

























Annona: Gracchian Period (133 BCE-100CE) 
133 BCE: Tiberius Gracchus passes 
rogatio Sempronia de pecunia regis 
Attali to fund his land commission. 
Fearful of his new power, the Senate 
assassinates Tiberius.  
129 BCE: The land commission of 
Tiberius ceases after the successful 
resettlement of 15,000 Romans. 
123 BCE: Tribune Gaius Gracchus 
passes the lex frumentaria to grant 
citizens the right to purchase 
subsidized grain every month. 
122 BCE: Gaius Gracchus  pushes 
forward the lex agraria and lex 
Rubrica to resettle Romans abroad. 
121 BCE: Gaius Gracchus kills himself. 
119-100BCE (?): Tribune Marcus 
Octavius replaces the lex frumentaria 
with his lex Octavia to reduce costs. 
100 BCE: Tribune Saturnius proposes 
to replace the lex Octavia with a new 
law, decreasing the price of 3 pound 
ration to five-sixth of an ass. After the 
Senate purchases grain to win 
support, the Senate arrests Saturnius. 
112-106 BCE: Jugurthine War 
135-132 BCE: First Servile War 
104-100 BCE: Second Servile War 

























Annona: Late Republic (100-27 BCE) 
81 BCE: The Senate repeals the lex 
Oxtavia, suspending discount grain 
distributions. 
74 BCE: The Senate appoints praetor 
Marcus Antonius with unlimited 
authority to chase down the pirates 
of Crete. 
73 BCE: Consuls Marcus Terentius 
Varro Lucullus and Gaius Cassius 
Longinus passed the lex Terentia et 
Cassia frumentria, restoring grain 
distributions. 
67 BCE: Tribune Aulus Gabinius 
passed the lex Gabinia over the 
opposition of the Senate to give 
leadership over the anti-piratical 
campaign to Pompey. 
62 BCE: Cato the Younger expands 
eligibility for grain distributions to 
forestall a loss of Senatorial authority. 
58 BCE: the tribune Publius Clodius 
Pulcher passed his lex Clodia 
frumentaria to subsume the entire 
Senatorial authority over the annona. 
57 BCE: Under the Lex Cornelia 
Caecilia, Pompey assumes the cura 
annonae. 
43 BCE: The Senate prohibits the 
creation of a cura annonae. 
83-81 BCE: Second Mithradatic  
Sulla’s Dictatorship and Consulship 
75-63 BCE: Third Mithradatic War 
49-45 BCE: Caesar’s Civil War 
73-71 BCE: Third Servile War 
31 BCE: Battle of Actium 

























Annona in the Early Julio-Claudian Dynasty of the Principate: 27 BCE-51 CE 
27 BCE: Constitutional Settlement of 
Augustus 24 BCE: Augustus assumes the cura 
annonae, distributing free grain. 
18 BCE: Augustus reforms the annona 
after the Senate failed to increase the 
new of officials. 
6 CE: Augustus bails out the Senate 
from a grain crisis. Augustus changes 
his policy to promote merchants’ 
interest with consumers. 
9-11(?) CE: Augustus appoints the 
equestrian Gaius Turranius the first 
permanent imperial praefectus 
annonae. 
19 CE: Tiberius imposes a maximum 
price on the annona subsidizing 
merchants 2 sesterces per modii after 
popular protests. 
32 CE: Tiberius chides the magistrates 
for their inability to control protests 
after people protest high grain prices. 
42 CE: Claudius subsidized winter-
voyages for the remaining 
negotiatores. 
51 CE: Claudius assumed any loss 
from winter voyages of negotiatores 
in the annona trade. Due to the 
expense, Claudius shifted to tax 
incentives. 
43 CE: Roman Invasion of Britain 
9 CE: Battle of the Teutoburg Forest 

























Annona in the Late Julio-Claudian and Flavian Dynasty of the Principate (51-89 CE) 
58 CE: Nero allows negotiatores to 
exclude their merchant ships from 
their taxable property. 
62 CE: Nero according to Tacitus 
tosses moldy public grain reserves 
into the Tiber to quell Parthian war 
anxiety. 
64 CE: Great Fire of Rome 
64 CE: Nero suspends free public 
grain distributions, setting a 
maximum price of 3 sesterces per 
modius, three pounds. 
65 CE: Pisonian Conspiracy 
64 CE: Nero attempts a canal project 
to ease transport. 
65 CE: Nero grants the Praetorian 
Guard free public grain distributions 
and two thousand sesterces. 
68 CE: Senator Vindex’s Gallic 
Rebellion 68 CE: Nero loses popular support for 
his monopolization of grain supplies. 
69 CE: Year of Four Emperors  
79 CE: Eruption of Mount Vesuvius 
89 CE: Domitian declares an edict to 
prohibit the creation of new 
vineyards in Italy and to uproot half 
of the provincial vineyards but never 
enforces. 


























Annona in the Nerva-Antonine Dynasty of the Principate (98-192 CE) 
96-98 CE: Nerva restores the Senate’s 
power and property after the seizures 
of Domitian. He resettles poor 
Romans across Italy on 60 million 
sesterces of land. 
98 CE: Mutiny of Casperius Aelianus 
and his Praetorian Guardsmen 
99 CE: Trajan relieves the famine of 
Egypt from Rome’s reserves. 
99 CE: Trajan grants grain to 5,000 
boys in the cities of Italy. 
113 CE: Trajan constructs a new 
harbor for Ostia to support his aid. 
192 CE: Commodus the last Nerva-
Antonine emperor falls unable to 
manage the annona. 
101-106: Dacian Wars 
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